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Section: New Results

Management and monitoring of P2P networks

Participants : Isabelle Chrisment [contact] , Olivier Festor, Juan Pablo Timpanaro.

Content pollution is one of the major issues affecting P2P file sharing networks. However, since early studies on FastTrack and Overnet, no recent investigation has reported its impact on current P2P networks. In [21] , we presented a method and the supporting architecture to quantify the pollution of contents in the KAD network. We first collected information on many popular files shared in this network. Then, we proposed a new way to detect content pollution by analyzing all filenames linked to a content with a metric based on the Tversky index and which gives very low error rates. By analyzing a large number of popular files, we showed that 2/3 of the contents are polluted, one part by index poisoning but the majority by a new, more dangerous, form of pollution that we call index falsification. This work was done, in collaboration with the University of Technology of Troyes, within the context of the ACDA-P2P(Approche Collaborative pour la Détection d'Attaques dans les réseaux Pair à Pair) Project funded by GIS- 3SGS(Groupement d'Intérêt Scientifique - Surveillance, Suretê et Sécurité des grands Systêmes).

BitTorrent is a widely deployed P2P file sharing protocol, extensively used to distribute digital content and software updates, among others. Recent actions against torrent and tracker repositories have fostered the move towards a fully distributed solution based on a distributed hash table to support both torrent search and tracker implementation. We conducted an analysis on one of the BitTorrent's DHT (Mainline DHT) and developed a monitoring architecture, so as to measure and discover security flaws on the network. In [23] we compared KAD DHT against BitTorrent DHT in terms of security by deploying different attacks on the network. We showed that the lack of security in Mainline DHT allows very efficient attacks that can easily impact the operation of the whole network. We also provided a peer-ID distribution analysis of the network, so as to adapt previous protection schemes to the Mainline DHT. The mechanisms are assessed through large-scale experiments on the real DHT-based BitTorrent tracker.

If BitTorrent's Mainline DHT is exposed to several identified security issues, in parallel, the KAD DHT has been the core of intense research and was improved over years. We presented a study that motivates the integration of both worlds. We provided a performance comparison of both DHTs in terms of publishing efficiency. We investigated the security threats and showed that the current BitTorrent's Mainline DHT is more vulnerable to attacks than KAD while the download service of BitTorrent has much better performance. Given the strengths and weaknesses of both DHTs, we designed a hybrid architecture [24] , which is based on KAD's indexation mechanism and BitTorrent download protocol. On the one hand, the client is able to index its files in the well-known KAD DHT, taking advantage of KAD's security mechanism and its double-indexation scheme. On the other hand, the client uses the BitTorrent download protocol so as to download a given file, which has been proven to surpass KAD's. We implemented this hybrid architecture, that we called hMule , as a unified KAD-BitTorrent file-sharing application , which is compatible with both P2P file sharing networks and provides the KAD advantages on indexation and the BitTorrent speed for transfer without losing backward compatibility.

We started our research about being anonymous when downloading from BitTorrent. We conducted a set of measurements from High Security Lab aiming to characterize the usage of the I2P network, a low-latency anonymous network based on garlic routing [35] . Our goal was to answer the following questions: what is the network used for? when is it used the most? which kind of applications the network designers should pay more attention to? We designed a distributed monitoring architecture for the I2P network and we showed that, through three one-week long experiments, we were able to identify 32% of all running applications, among web servers and file-sharing clients. Additionally, we identified 37% of published I2P applications, which turned out to be unreachable after their publication on the I2P distributed database.

In parallel, we built-up a model of I2P encryption/decryption approach and using the Avispa tool, we able to find a possible attack on the network. Further work will be focused on probing right and on developing a proof-of-concept of this.