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Section: Partnerships and Cooperations

ANR Projects with Industrials

  • SAPHIR-II (Sécurité et Analyse des Primitives de Hachage Innovantes et Récentes)

       Security and analysis of innovating and recent hashing primitives.

    Participants : Patrick Derbez, Jérémy Jean.

    From April 2009 to March 2013.

    Partners: France Telecom R&D, Gemalto, EADS, SAGEM, DCSSI, Cryptolog, Inria/Secret, UVSQ, XLIM, CryptoExperts.

  • PACE: Pairings and Advances in Cryptology for E-cash.

    Participants : Olivier Blazy, David Pointcheval, Damien Vergnaud.

    From December 2007 to February 2012.

    Partners: France Telecom R&D, NXP, Gemalto, CNRS/LIX (Inria/TANC), Univ. Caen, Cryptolog.

    This project aims at studying new properties of groups (similar to pairings, or variants), and then to exploit them in order to achieve more practical e-cash systems.

  • BEST: Broadcast Encryption for Secure Telecommunications.

    Participants : Duong Hieu Phan, David Pointcheval, Elizabeth Quaglia, Mario Strefler.

    From December 2009 to November 2013.

    Partners: Thales, Nagra, CryptoExperts, Univ. Paris 8.

    This project aims at studying broadcast encryption and traitor tracing, with applications to the Pay-TV and geolocalisation services.

  • PRINCE: Proven Resilience against Information leakage in Cryptographic Engineering.

    Participants : Fabrice Ben Hamouda, Michel Ferreira Abdalla, David Pointcheval.

    From December 2010 to November 2014.

    Partners: UVSQ, Oberthur Technologies, Ingenico, Gemalto, Tranef.

    We aim to undertake research in the field of leakage-resilient cryptography with a practical point of view. Our goal is to design efficient leakage-resilient cryptographic algorithms and invent new countermeasures for non-leakage-resilient cryptographic standards. These outcomes shall realize a provable level of security against side-channel attacks and come with a formally verified implementation. For this every practical aspect of the secure implementation of cryptographic schemes must be taken into account, ranging from the high-level security protocols to the cryptographic algorithms and from these algorithms to their implementation on specific devices which hardware design may feature different leakage models.